Petroleum Business Review

Abstract This article examines public liability and administrative accountability for environmental and climate risks and harms in Iran’s oil and gas sector. It explains how recurrent harms, including oil pollution, industrial accidents, and chronic air-quality crises, are intensified by regulatory omissions and fragmented institutional mandates. The study clarifies when governmental bodies and state-owned operators may bear responsibility not only for polluting conduct, but also for failures of prevention, supervision, and timely response. Using doctrinal legal analysis combined with institutional governance analysis, it maps the interaction between constitutional and statutory environmental duties, civil and criminal liability tools, and administrative-law mechanisms for challenging unlawful inaction. The findings suggest that Iran’s framework contains significant formal safeguards, yet accountability is often weakened by overlapping competences, under-enforcement, and evidentiary barriers in proving omission-based causation and attribution. Judicial review of administrative inaction provides an important corrective, but it rarely suffices to internalize environmental costs or deter systematic negligence. Drawing brief comparative insights, the article argues that effective governance requires clearer allocation of duties, enforceable standards of diligence for public authorities, and credible oversight capable of triggering corrective action before harm becomes irreversible. It proposes targeted reforms, notably codifying a “public duty of care,” strengthening coordination and transparency, widening access to remedies against manifest non-performance, and establishing an independent oversight function to reduce blame-shifting and improve compliance. To avoid conceptual overbreadth, the article distinguishes direct oil-and-gas environmental incidents from air-pollution and climate-related harms, using the latter only where they illuminate the common problem of omission-based public accountability.

Abstract One of the main challenges for the regulators of oil contracts in Iran is the financial and taxation system and the auditing procedures of oil contracts. This issue has, even after the Islamic Revolution and until today, always been one of the concerns of oil stakeholders, especially in Iran. Nowadays with the selection of the service contract format as the only approved contractual template in upstream oil operations, oil companies, acting as contractors, carry out the investment in oil operations and, if the contractual objectives are achieved, are entitled not only to the reimbursement of costs but also to receive fees. Based on the principle of “no profit, no loss” and in order to prevent the contractor from unjustly benefiting by overstating incurred expenses, the parties classify the costs and, using accounting and auditing principles, stipulate the definitions, instances, and calculations methods of the costs, and so forth. Given Iran’s growing need to conclude Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs) aimed at facilitating technology transfer through enhanced reservoir recovery by assigning operational responsibilities to an Iranian operating company while maintaining the contractor’s overall responsibility it is essential to revise and adapt Iran’s accounting and auditing procedures to align with the specific requirements of such agreements. In this regard, the model accounting procedures published by international petroleum associations can serve as effective and practical benchmarks for reform.